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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31) 
(1986), formerly Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(21) and (22), the 
providing of one-way paging service to the general public fails 
to constitute the service of a "public utility," and is, there-
fore, not subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public 
Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU"). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statutory provisions necessary to a final 
resolution of the present appeal are: Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986), a copy of which is attached as 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves the PSCU's lack of statutory jurisdic-
tion over one-way paging services for the reason that one-way 
paging service is not a public utility. This case is before 
the Court on appeal as of right brought by defendant and appel-
lant American Paging, Inc. (of Utah) ("American Paging") from 
an Order and Declaratory Judgment in favor of plaintiffs and 
respondents, David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications 
("Industrial") and Mobile Telephone, Inc. ("Mobile"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September 1983, American Paging began to offer one-way 
paging service in Utah after receiving a letter from the PSCU, 
stating that it was not necessary for American Paging to file 
an application for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity because American Paging proposed to offer only such 
services and the PSCU did not deem itself as having jurisdic-
tion over such paging services. (R. at 28-29.) 
On November 28, 1983, after a full hearing and complete 
consideration of the jurisdictional issue, the PSCU formally 
held that it lacks statutory jurisdiction over the one-way 
paging services of American Paging in a proceeding involving a 
complaint filed by Industrial against American Paging and an 
Order to Show Cause filed by the Division of Public Utilities. 
(R. at 194.) See Order in PSCU Case No. 83-044-03, attached as 
Addendum B. 
Also, on November 28, 1983, the PSCU dismissed an applica-
tion of Page America of Utah, Inc., which had been filed 
seeking a certificate of authority from the PSCU to furnish 
one-way paging service, based upon its determination that it 
lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging services. (R. at 
196-210.) See In the Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc., 
Order on Motion for Exempt Certificate, PSCU Case No. 
83-082-01, attached as Addendum C. 
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Industrial then appealed the Page America Order to the Utah 
Supreme Court. On appeal, this Court addressed the procedural 
issues raised and concluded that the PSCU was required to once 
again review the matter by following the requirements of the 
Utah Administrative Rule-making Act. See Williams v. Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), attached 
as Addendum D. 
Following the issuance of the Williams v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah decision, Industrial and Mobile filed 
actions against American Paging in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, claiming monetary damages based on 
the alleged unlawful performance of paging services in Utah by 
American Paging under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-7-22 (1953 as amended). American Paging filed a motion to 
dismiss the complaints, and Industrial and Mobile filed motions 
for partial summary judgment. Following oral arguments on the 
motions, Judge Hanson denied both motions, but entered his 
Order and Declaratory Judgment, indicating that, based upon his 
interpretation of this Court's decision in Williams v. Public 
Service Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), the 
providing of one-way paging services to the general public does 
constitute the service of a public utility which is subject to 
the regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU. Judge Hanson then 
also granted the parties' request for certification of final 
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judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Copies of the Order and Declaratory Judgment are 
attached as Addendum E. (R. at 249-258.) 
On April 15, 1986, the PSCU filed a Notice of Proposed Rule 
with the Office of Administrative Rules, which stated that the 
PSCU lacks jurisdiction over one-way paging. After further com-
pliance with the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act's require-
ments and procedures, the PSCU, on May 16, 1986, restated its 
former jurisdictional determination in formal PSCU Rule No. 
8304, concluding that "[t]he Public Service Commission of Utah 
does not have jurisdiction over one-way paging services. . . ." 
(R. at 30.) A copy of the Rule is attached as Addendum F. 
In order to further clarify the PSCU's jurisdiction as it 
might have been altered by the legislative enactment of the 
Public Telecommunications Utilities Act in 1985, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-8b-l, e_t seq. , American Paging submitted an application to 
the PSCU seeking a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity to operate as a public utility in the State of Utah 
and simultaneously moved to dismiss its own application based 
on the jurisdictional grounds. On May 23, 1986, the PSCU in 
Case No. 85-2007-01 entered its Order granting American 
Paging1s motion to dismiss its own application upon the grounds 
that the PSCU has no jurisdiction to regulate American Paging1s 
-4-
one-way paging services. (R. at 30-31.)* A copy of the Order 
is attached as Addendum G. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The PSCU lacks statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging 
services because such services do not constitute those of a 
public utility. Therefore, operation of one-way paging services 
cannot form the basis of an action for damages under the provi-
sions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 for the following reasons: 
(1) one-way paging does not fall within the Public Utilities 
Act, Chapter 2 definitions of public utilities services which 
are subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction; (2) the great 
weight of case authority demonstrates that one-way paging 
systems are not public utility services and are not subject to 
PSCU statutory jurisdiction under relevant Utah statutes; 
(3) this Court did not address the issue of statutory 
jurisdiction over one-way paging in its Williams decision; and 
(4) a history of infrequent interpretive regulation or unwit-
ting PSCU accession to requests for certificates of authority 
The validity of PSCU Rule 8304 and the PSCU's subsequent 
Order of Dismissal of American Paging's application are the 
subject of review by this Court sought by Industrial, in 
Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and 860314. All 
parties to these cases as well as the instant case have stipu-
lated to the consolidation of those cases with the instant case 
for the purpose of this Court's review. 
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cannot create or confer statutory jurisdiction in violation of 
legislative enactments. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AMERICAN PAGING'S SERVICE IS NOT ENCOMPASSED 
BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-2-1 (1986), AND 
CANNOT FORM THE BASIS FOR AN ACTION FOR 
DAMAGES UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-7-22 
(1986). 
In Utah, the standard for stating a jurisdictionally sound 
claim against any entity under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 (1986) 
is not met unless the entity is a public utility. 
The alleged jurisdictional basis for Industrial and 
Mobile's claim against American Paging is found in the follow-
ing statutory language: 
In case any public utility shall do or cause or permit 
to be done any act, matter or thing prohibited, for-
bidden or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do 
any act, matter or thing required to be done either by 
the Constitution or any law of this state or by any 
order or decision of the Commission, such public util-
ity shall be liable to the persons affected thereby 
for all losses, damages or injury caused thereby or 
resulting therefrom . . . . (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-22 (1986). According to the language of 
Section 22, a defendant is not liable for plaintiff's alleged 
damage, loss, or injury unless the defendant is a public 
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utility under the definitions set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1 (1986). 
Thus, the dispositive issue in this case is whether or not 
one-way paging services constitute a legislatively defined 
public utility, subject to PSCU regulatory jurisdiction. No 
case law or statutory authority supports Industrial and 
Mobile's contention that American Paging*s one-way paging 
service is a public utility under the Utah Public Utilities 
Act, or that American Paging's service falls within the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the PSCU. 
A. PSCU Statutory Jurisdiction Over Public Utilities Must 
Be Strictly Construed. 
The Public Utilities Act, Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986), 
vests authority in the commission to regulate only public 
utilities. See also Public Utility Commission v. Garvloch, 54 
Utah 406, 181 P. 272, 276 (1919). Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 
enumerates the utilities which are subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction and regulation. The relevant provision of the Act 
for the purposes of this appeal is section 54-2-1(30) and (31) 
which gives the PSCU regulatory jurisdiction over "telephone 
corporations," which are defined as "every corporation and 
person . . . owning, controlling, operating, or managing any 
telephone line for public service within this state. . . . " Id. 
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The PSCU's power of regulation is derivative. The PSCU may 
only regulate entities included within the statutory defini-
tions of "public utility," specifically telephone corporations 
that utilize a telephone line. Because the statutory delega-
tion of authority under subsections (30) and (31) involves 
imposition of regulatory burdens, statutory jurisdiction over 
such telephone corporations must be strictly construed. Basin 
Flying Service v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 531 P.2d 
1303 (Utah 1975) . 
This Court upholds strict construction of public utility 
definitions to the extent that "restraints or duties imposed by 
law must be clear and unequivocal." Id., at 1305. In Basin 
Flying Service, this Court specifically declared that: 
[I]t is well established that a regulatory body such 
as the Public Service Commission, which is created by 
and derives its powers and duties from statute, has no 
inherent regulatory powers, but only those which are 
expressly granted, or which are clearly implied as 
necessary to the discharge of the duties and responsi-
bilities imposed upon it. 
Id. See also Public Service Commission of Wyoming v. Formal 
Complaint of WNZ Co., 641 P.2d 183, 186 (Wyo. 1982) (holding 
that "[T]he statutes creating and empowering the PSC must be 
strictly construed and any reasonable doubt of the existence of 
any power must be resolved against the exercise thereof.") 
-8-
Importantly, this Court has never acknowledged statutory 
jurisdiction or upheld PSCU assertion of regulatory power over 
commercial one-way paging under the provisions of Chapter 2 of 
the Public Utilities Act. Indeed, in Medic-Call, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258, 
260-261 (1970), this Court stated that it: 
did not reach the issue of whether a publicly avail-
able paging service, . . . would be a public utility 
because [its] holding was limited to the private 
nature of arrangements before [it]. 
Nevertheless, the clear majority of other jurisdictions that 
have addressed this specific issue have held that one-way 
paging services do not constitute public utility services and 
thus, should not be subject to commission regulation. See 
Annot. 44 A.L.R. 4th 216, 220-222 (1986). For a complete 
discussion of relevant case authorities, see American Paging's 
Brief in Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and 
860314, Points 1(A) and (B). 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1 Excludes One-Way Paging From 
Its Scope of Regulation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(31) (1986) defines a telephone line 
as follows: 
[A]11 conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instru-
ments and appliances, and all other real estate and 
fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, 
operated, or managed in connection with or to facili-
tate communication by telephone whether such communi-
cation is had with or without the use of transmission 
wires. (Emphasis added.) 
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If one-way paging systems do not utilize a telephone line "in 
connection with or to facilitate communications by telephone," 
they are neither telephone corporations nor public utilities 
subject to PSCU regulation. 
Utah law and principles of statutory construction demand 
that statutes be read according to their plain meaning so as to 
avoid absurd results. Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 
P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). Applying this plain meaning and 
strict construction principle, the PSCU excluded one-way paging 
services from the statutory definition of telephone corporation. 
In interpreting the key definition of "telephone line" in 
the Page America Order, the Commission stated the several 
characteristics which distinguish one-way paging services from 
what constitutes a public utility under section 54-2-1. One of 
the most compelling justifications for excluding one-way paging 
from regulation as a telephone corporation is stated by the 
PSCU as follows: 
The distinction between paging and telephone 
service is critical because if in defining "telephone 
line" one focuses on the phrase "facilitate telephone 
communication," the scope of potentially regulated 
services becomes staggering. Conceivably the Commis-
sion should then regulate all suppliers of telephone 
equipment, e.g. Radio Shack, Sears, J. C. Penney, 
Panasonic; suppliers of wiring components; all sup-
pliers of telephone directories, including the many 
not affiliated with the Bell system; telephone answer-
ing services, telephone answering devices and all such 
suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper classified 
advertising, _ad absurdum. The focus instead should be 
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on the connotation of telephone service which implies 
interactive, and at least potentially extended two-way 
communication. That was certainly the focus in 1917 
when the statute was enacted, since most of the ser-
vices now technologically feasible were not foreseen 
at that time. Paging service is conceptually no 
different from answering services (which have never 
been considered appropriate objects of state regula-
tion); it is the same service offered through a 
different medium. Telephone service over land lines 
or radio waves is fundamentally the same service 
irrespective of the means of transmission. But tele-
phone service is a two-way service; paging service is 
one-way call notification. 
In the Matter of Page America of Utah, Inc., Order on Motion 
for Exempt Certificate, PSCU Case No. 83-082-01 at 11. 
The exclusion of one-way paging services from public 
utility regulation is the correct interpretation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31). First, the statute calls for use 
of telephone equipment "in connection with or to facilitate 
communication by telephone," which contemplates two-way inter-
active communication, not just message transmission. Second, 
one-way paging does not under any description constitute two-
way interactive communication achieved by using equipment "in 
connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone." 
To include one-way paging within the statutory definition of 
telephone corporations which utilize a telephone line would 
result in an absurd overextension of statutory jurisdiction in 
violation of this Court's mandates. Curtis, 575 P.2d at 1046. 
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The one-way paging process is accomplished by simply stor-
ing a message with a service, which either notifies the paging 
customer that the message is waiting, or sends the message 
directly to the customer. In either case, the customer cannot 
interactively communicate with the caller as with "communica-
tion by telephone," as required by statute to be regulated as a 
public utility. 
The PSCU therefore adopted a reasonable definition of the 
terms "in connection with" and "facilitate" as used in the 
statute. A broad and unchecked definition of such terms could 
lead to unintended and absurd results. The absurdity of a 
broad definition of the term "facilitate" is noted in Illinois 
Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 4 4 7 
N.E.2d 295, 298 (111. 1983), as follows: 
The Commission points out that the publishers of tele-
phone classified directors, such as legal or medical 
directories also facilitate telephone communication, 
but it could hardly be said that those publishers were 
intended by the legislature to be considered public 
utilities. Similarly it could be said that simple 
answering services aid and facilitate telephone 
communication. But it is obvious that the nature of 
the service is not a functional part of the transmis-
sion of message by telephone, nor is radio paging. 
It is submitted that the term "facilitate" as used in the 
Utah statute is viewed with common sense and applied only to 
that equipment and property used directly in the transmission 
of a two-way telephone communication. Otherwise, no reasonable 
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limit to PSCU regulatory function in connection with telephone 
service can be attained. 
C. Case Authority Demonstrates That One-Way Paging Is Not 
A Public Utility Service And Is Not Subject To PSCU 
Statutory Jurisdiction. 
American Paging has fully discussed the weight of authority 
denouncing state regulation of one-way paging services in its 
brief filed in Supreme Court Consolidated Case Nos. 860313 and 
860314 at Point 1(A) and (B). 
For the reasons stated herein and in the previous American 
Paging brief, the majority of jurisdictions interpreting Public 
Utility Acts similar to the Utah Act have excluded one-way 
paging services from public utility regulation. See In Re 
Cincinnati Radiotelephone Systems, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 826 (Ohio 
1976) (holding that one-way paging is neither "a telephone 
company" nor a "public utility."); Illinois Consolidated 
Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 447 N.E.2d 295 
(111. 1983) (holding that because one-way paging cannot be used 
for two-way communications, it cannot be regulated as a utility 
used "for or in connection with . . . the transmission of tele-
graph or telephone messages."); In Re Answerphone of Kansas 
City, Inc., 87 P.U.R.3d 164 (Mo. PSC 1970); Radio Telephone 
Communications, Inc. v. Southeastern Telephone, 170 S.2d 577 
(Fla. 1964); Appeal of Omni- Communications, Inc., 451 A.2d 
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1289 (N.H. 1982) (holding that the Public Utilities Commission 
had no authority to regulate radio pagers and any such regula-
tion constitutes "interference and disruption of free market 
private enterprise."); and Ram Broadcasting v. Michigan Public 
Service Commission, 317 N.W.2d 295 (Mich. App. 1982) (holding 
one-way radio pagers not within the scope of the Public Service 
Commission's jurisdiction over public utilities.) 
POINT II 
THIS COURT'S WILLIAMS V. PUBLIC SERVICE COM-
MISSION OF UTAH DECISION DID NOT ADDRESS THE 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE OF PSCU STATUTORY JURISDIC-
TION OVER ONE-WAY PAGING PURSUANT TO UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986). 
In the court below, Industrial and Mobile contended that 
this Court's recent decision in Williams v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986) addressed and 
decided the substantive issue of PSCU statutory jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. This Court's recent Williams 
decision is, however, completely devoid of any discussion 
relative to the scope of regulatory power legislatively granted 
to the PSCU by Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31). Impor-
tantly, this Court's only discussion of the issue of statutory 
jurisdiction over one-way paging was made in the Medic-Call 
decision. In the Medic-Call case, this Court held that one-way 
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paging service, operated in the private sector by physicians, 
is not a public utility service and cannot be regulated by 
PSCU. Additionally, in addressing the status of one-way paging 
as a public utility, this Court stated: 
The service [one-way paging] is comparable to that 
which would be rendered by runners or call boys to 
notify doctors that they were wanted on the phone. 
One wonders just how the defendant would go about 
regulating the service even if it had the power to do 
so. 
If defendants can regulate the service rendered by 
plaintiffs herein, could they not with equal propriety 
regulate the semaphore signaling of the boy scouts or 
the smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting expedi-
tion? 
Medic-Call, 470 P.2d at 260. 
In Williams, this Court noted that in the prior case of 
Medic-Call it "did not reach the issue of whether publicly 
available paging service . . . would be a public 
utility. . . ." Williams, 720 P.2d 777, n.9. It was not until 
1983, that the PSCU determined that it has no statutory 
jurisdiction over commercial one-way paging services. Up to 
that time, neither the PSCU nor this Court had addressed the 
specific issue of whether the PSCU lacked statutory jurisdic-
tion over commercial one-way paging. 
Furthermore, nowhere in the Williams opinion did this Court 
state that one-way paging is a public utility service under the 
definitions then contained in the Public Utilities Act nor did 
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this Court indicate that it was deciding anything but the 
procedural rulemaking issue before it. Therefore, any other 
commentary in the Williams opinion concerning unwitting grants 
of certificates of authority is not determinative of the issue 
of the legislative grant of jurisdiction of the PSCU. 
In Williams, this Court addressed only the procedural ques-
tion presented to it and left the statutory jurisdiction deter-
mination to the PSCU, to be resolved in a later rulemaking 
proceeding pursuant to the expertise of the PSCU. This Court 
stated: 
the jurisdictional issue [PSCU jurisdiction over one-
way paging] likely will be resolved by a rulemaking 
proceeding on remand and will obviate the need for 
future proceedings . . . . (Emphasis added). 
Williams, 720 P.2d at 777. The PSCU complied with the Supreme 
Court's directive and again determined that it lacks jurisdic-
tion over one-way paging services through a proper rulemaking 
procedure. See Addenda F and G. 
POINT III 
PRIOR INTERPRETIVE OR INADVERTENT REGULATION 
OF ONE-WAY PAGING DOES NOT CONFER STATUTORY 
JURISDICTION ON THE PSCU. 
In the court below, Industrial argued that the PSCU's 
history of regulation creates jurisdiction over one-way 
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paging. Industrial cited Husky Oil Co. of Delaware v. State 
Tax Commission of Utah, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976) as authority 
for the proposition that prior regulation of one-way paging 
somehow creates statutory jurisdiction to regulate non-public 
utilities and further prevents departure from such inadvertent 
and improper "interpretive regulation." Such an argument 
cannot prevail. Otherwise, the Commission could endow itself 
with authority which the legislature never intended through its 
own sporadic and unwitting grants of certificates of authority. 
Respondents seriously misconstrue the distinction between 
"regulation" and "statutory jurisdiction." Respondents mis-
takenly assume that an administrative agency's improper or 
unwitting assertion of regulation alters a legislative grant of 
authority and, thus, brings the non-regulated activity within 
the Utah Legislature's definition of public utilities. 
Respondents' assumption and argument are both (A) contrary 
to Utah law, and (B) inconsistent with and not applicable to 
the critical facts in the instant case. 
A. Prior PSCU Regulation Does Not Confer Statutory 
Jurisdiction. 
This Court upholds the principle of law that an administra-
tive interpretation out of harmony with and contrary to express 
provisions of statutes interpreted cannot be given weight 
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because administrative construction may not be substituted for 
legislation. Utah Hotel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 
24, 151 P.2d 467, 470-73 (1944); Basin Flying Service v. Public 
Service Commission, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975). 
In Utah Hotel, this Court stated that: 
Where an interpretive regulation is involved, the 
ultimate question before the court is: What does the 
statute mean?. . . Interpretive regulations . . . 
have validity in judicial proceedings only to the 
extent that they correctly construe the statute and 
then, strictly speaking, it is the statute and not the 
regulation to which the individual [or entity] must 
conform. (Emphasis added.) 
Id. at 472. Hence, even though there existed improper acces-
sion to regulation of one-way paging, such regulation cannot 
alter PSCU statutory jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-2-1(30) and (31), which excludes one-way paging from 
public utility regulation. 
This Court further stated that prior improper regulation 
pursuant to a faulty interpretation does not have the effect of 
changing statutory powers. This Court declared the unwitting 
or improper interpretation of a statute: 
was purely a question of law and the erroneous inter-
pretation of the statute by the Commission could not 
have the effect of changing liability under the 
statute nor of estopping the Commission from later 
changing its interpretation. 
Id. at 470. 
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In the instant case, the PSCU never considered the interpre-
tation of the definition of "telephone line" as applied to 
paging until 1983. It simply granted applications for certif-
icates of convenience and necessity to render paging service, 
with but one exception, in conjunction with two-way mobile 
telephone service. The PSCU did not ever fully consider the 
extent of its statutory jurisdiction until 1983. 
The Husky decision relied upon by respondents has no appli-
cation to the instant appeal for several reasons: 
First, the Husky decision concerned a radical departure 
from a formal and specific administrative rule upon which the 
public had relied and which was consistently followed. In the 
instant case, there can be no such radical department from an 
administrative rule because the PSCU never formally ruled that 
it has jurisdiction over one-way paging services. 
Second, in the Husky case, the State Tax Commission had 
actually promulgated and followed formal Regulation S-38 in 
1937, exempting certain sales transactions from taxation. 
Later in 1971, the State Tax Commission contradicted the 
statute by deleting the exemption from the regulation and added 
language making the previously exempted transactions taxable. 
Husky, 556 P.2d at 1270. In the instant case, the PSCU's rule 
excluding one-way paging from regulation is consistent with the 
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relevant statutes and corrects a previous inadvertant regula-
tory oversight. 
Finally, two Utah Supreme Court decisions had acknowledged 
the validity of the 1937 S-38 exemption regulation in Husky and 
its impact on relevant statutes. The departure from a prior 
administrative rule in Husky not only violated the relevant 
statute, but it also was contrary to Utah law. Id.. In con-
trast, this Court has never addressed the issue of statutory 
jurisdiction over commercially offered one-way paging. 
B. Respondents' Arguments Are Not Applicable To The Facts 
In The Instant Case. 
The facts demonstrate that only one single certificate 
granting authority to operate a one-way paging service has ever 
been granted by the PSCU. Williams v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 720 P.2d at 774. Any other certificates were granted 
only in connection with mobile telephone services, clearly 
within the section 54-2-1 definition of public utilities. When 
the experience and expertise of the PSCU was actually focused 
on the issue of statutory jurisdiction over one-way paging in a 
full hearing in the adversarial context, the PSCU decided that 
it did not have jurisdiction over one-way paging. 
The PSCU further concluded that: 
In construing its jurisdiction as a matter of first 
impression . . . [W]e are persuaded by our review of 
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Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court has never 
squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over 
paging services. 
* * * * * 
We further conclude that the inclusion of paging 
service in any certificate issued by the Commission, 
authorizing the holders to provide mobile telephone 
service, was error. . . . 
Id. 
In the instant case, unlike Utah Hotel, the Tax Commission 
never interpreted the jurisdictional statutes until the present 
controversy arose in 1983. Unlike the Husky Oil decision, the 
PSCU's most recent interpretation of statutory jurisdiction 
conforms to and is consistent with statutory authority. There-
fore, a correct construction of the governing statutory provi-
sions convincingly demonstrates that one-way paging services 
are not those of a public utility and should not be subject to 
PSCU regulation. 
The fact that the PSCU may have mistakenly and inadver-
tently acceded to the regulation of paging services for several 
years cannot alter the legislative grant of authority to the 
PSCU under Utah Code Ann. § 54-2-1(30) and (31) which excludes 
one-way paging from regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order and Declaratory 
Judgment of the district court should be reversed for the 
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reason that the PSCU does not have statutory jurisdiction over 
one-way paging. The district court should be directed to 
dismiss Industrial and Mobile's claims for damages for the 
reason that American Paging is not a public utility. 
DATED this \z ~ day of December, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
-By- ^x U^ oe^ n^ —^^  
Stuart^. Poelman 
Larry R. Laycock 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant American Paging, 
Inc. (of Utah) 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann., § 54-2-1(30) and (31) (1986). 
Public Utilities Definitions: 
When used in this title: 
• * * * 
(30) "Telephone corporation11 includes every 
corporation and person, their lessees, trustees, 
and receivers, owning, controlling, operating, 
or managing any telephone line for public ser-
vice within this state, provided, however, that 
all corporations, partnerships, or firms pro-
viding intrastate cellular telephone service 
shall cease to be "telephone corporations" nine 
months after both the wire-line and the nonwire-
line cellular service providers have been issued 
covering licenses by the Federal Communications 
Commission. It does not include any person 
which provides, on a resale basis, any telephone 
or telecommunication service which is purchased 
from a telephone corporation. 
(31) "Telephone line" includes all conduits, 
ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments, and 
applicances, and all other real estate, fixtures, 
and personal property owned, controlled, oper-
ated, or managed in connection with or to facili-
tate communication by telephone whether that com-
munication is had with or without the use of 
transmission wires. 
ADDENDUM B 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Complaint 
of DAVID R. WILLIAMS, dba 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS 
Against American Paging of 
Utah, Inc. 
CASE NO. 83-044-03 
ORDER 
By the Commission: 
Based upon the Order of the Commission in Case No. 
83-082-01, In the matter of the application of Page America of 
Utah/ Inc. for a certificate of convenience and necessity as a 
common carrier for furnishinq pagina service to areas within Salt 
ii •• i . i n • i m • i • • - i • i • i i i i i 
Lake, Davis, and Tooele Countiesy Utah, in which the Commission 
held that it lacked regulatory jurisdiction over one-way paging 
service, the complaint herein is deemed moot, as is the Petition 
for an Order to Show Cause filed by the Division of Public 
Utilities, and both are therefore dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion. 
DATED at Salt Lake Cityf Utah, this 28th day of November, 
1983. 
/s/ Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) /s/ David R. Irvine, Commissioner 
/s/ James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
/s/ Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
ADDENDUM C 
• BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter cf the Applica-
tion Of PAGE AMERICA OF*UTAH, 
INC. for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity as a 
Common Carrier for Furnishing 
Paging Service to Areas Within 
Salt Lake, Davis, Utah, and 
Tooele Counties, Utan. 
CASE NO. 83-082-01 
ORDER ON MOTICM 
FOR EX- rrc^T ~"" ~* T r 
Appearances: 
Stephen R. Randle 
Stuart L. Poelman 
Erintcn R. Burbidce 
K. M. Lewis 
Richard Hinckley, 
Assistant Attcrr.e; 
General 
For Applicant 
n
 American Paging cf Utah, 
Inc., amicus curiae 
" David R. Williams, dba 
Industrial 
Communicaticns, 
Protestant 
" Mcbile Telephone, Inc., 
Protestant 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State cf Utah 
By the Commission: 
Applicant filed its application in this matter August 10, 
1983. Subsequent thereto, the question arose whether the Commis-
sion had jurisdiction to entertain said application, and the 
Commission asked fcr briefs on the matter. The parties thereaf-
ter asked for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose cf develop-
ing the record to describe the nature cf their respective busi-
ness operations as a basic for resolving the jurisdictional 
issue. Said hearing took place on November 7, 1983, at the hour 
r--i 
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of 2:00 p.m., before A. Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge 
for the Commission. Evidence was offered and received, and the 
Administrative Law Judge, having considered the same, together 
with the briefs submitted, new enters the following Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order based thereon. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Page America of Utah, Inc., hereafter called "Appli-
cant" is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of 
the State of Utah, with its principal office at Salt Lake City, 
Utah. It is a subsidiary of Page America Group, Inc., a holding 
company with operating companies in a large number of states 
nationwide. Applicant's position is supported by American 
Paging, Inc., appearing as amicus curiae, hereafter called 
"American," a corporation qualified to do business in the srate 
of Utah, and which is already operating a paging service, though 
without certification from this Commission. The application is 
opposed by David R. Williams, cba Industrial Communications, 
hereafter called "Industrial", and by Mobile Telephone, Inc., a 
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of 
Utah, hereafter called "MTI". The Division of Public Utilities 
also epposes the present motion of the Applicant for an exempt 
certificate, and instead asks the Commission to exercise limited 
regulatory oversight of paging service, similar to that which we 
exercise over WATS resellers. 
2. Both of the protestants currently hold certificates of 
convenience and necessity from this Commission authorizing them 
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to provide mobile radio-telephone service in various parts of the 
state# and in conjunction therewith to operate paging service as 
well. The grants of authority have been made at various times, 
and with a single exception have provided for authority to 
operate both mobile telephone and paging service. In 1974, the 
Commission issued a certificate to Mobile Telephone Service of 
Southern Utah, Inc. (which corporation is not a Protestant in 
this case) in Case No. 6969 which dealt exclusively with the 
provision of pacing service, and the Protestants cite that case 
to the Commission as determinitive that the Commission has 
already decided the jurisdictional issue herein. In one case, to 
be discussed hereafter, the Commission did assert jurisdiction 
over such service, but that case was reversed by the Utah Supreme 
Court, and in view of the Court's disposition of the same, we do 
not consider ourselves bound by it. As we will discuss hereaf-
ter, we do not believe that the Supreme Court has ruled in 
respect to the Commission's jurisdiction over paging services. 
3. Paging technology has been developing extremely rapidly 
over the past ten to fifteen years. Prior to that time, substan-
tially the only method pecple had of ensuring that they be 
apprised of all calls when they were away from the phone, was to 
employ an answering service. The calling party would leave a 
message with the answering service, to be relayed when the 
customer of the answering service phoned in to get the messages. 
There was no way to let the customer know immediately when a 
message had been left. 
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4. The first electronic improvement was a tone-only 
"beeper". This was an electronic device which could be activated 
by a radio signal from the answering service providing a high-
pitch tone to alert the customer that a message was waiting. The 
most primitive form of this system involves a human activating 
the beeper and giving the customer a message when the customer 
phones in* In almost all cases this primitive system has been 
superseded by a machine which automatically activates the beeper 
and then plays back the caller's message when the customer phones 
in. 
5. The next advance in technology was to provide "tcne-tvo 
address" service which would enable a customer, by the type of 
the tone, to discern which of two numbers to call to get mes-
sages. This type of service has in turn been superseded by "tone 
and voice" service, which allows a person to hear the message 
after the beeper is activated, thus sparing the necessity of 
phoning in to get messages. Now on the horizon are two further 
advances in the technology: digital display (already available) 
which will display the message in numeric form, obviously in most 
cases directing the customer which telephone number to call tc 
reach the caller. Digital display is already available in many 
parts of the country and has very recently been introduced in the 
Salt Lake market. It is likely to be superseded quite scon by an 
"alpha-numeric" display which will enable the customer to receive 
a short written message as well as numeric data. 
C-4 
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6. It is new foreseeable that in the near future the 
alpha-numeric display will enable the customer to use the ser-
vices of a "network," which will link him to data bases, and will 
enable him to use his service nationwide. The Applicant and 
American are each involved in establishing such a network. Hone 
of the existing certificated carriers in Utah have taken concrete 
steps in such a direction. 
7. Despite the rapid advances in the technology, and the 
potential for greater usefulness, the essential structure of the 
service remains the same. A caller uses the telephone system to 
reach the service and leave a message. The message is stored. 
There is then a retransmission, either to alert the customer that 
there is a message, or to send it directly for voice or display. 
The retransmission may or may not involve use of the land lines. 
The service requires, by way of equipment, some means of answer-
ing the calls, storing the messages, transmitting the alert 
signal, and replaying the stored message. The only part which 
must be done electronically is the transmission of the alert 
signal. Obviously, a manual system for the other part of the 
operation would be intolerably cumbersome, and hence automated 
equipment to handle these aspects has been available for some 
time. Although this renders the establishment of such a system 
expensive, nevertheless, if one compares the capital of such an 
operation with that required for a land line telephone system, or 
similar fixed utility, they are relatively modest. Furthermore, 
the operation of such a system does not involve the installation 
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and maintenance of a wide-spread, expensive physical distribution 
system. 
8. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has al-
located two primary bands for paging service. One, commonly 
known as the "high band," lies around 900 MHz. "Low bandH lies 
around 35 and 43 MKz. The FCC has recently allocated 68 addi-
tional channels for the "high band" and 28 channels in the "low 
band". Between them, the two bands have had only eight channels 
heretofore. The FCC has also considerably liberalized its 
criteria for granting new licenses on these bands. 
9. In the wake of the TCC allocation of additional chan-
nels i and relaxation of licensing requirements# there has been a 
perceptible trend in a number of states toward relaxing regu-
lation of paging services, or deregulating them altogether. 
10. At present, the Applicant's subsidiaries in a number of 
other states are offering tone and voice paging, digital paging, 
and in some cases alpha-numeric paging. They prcpose to offer 
all forms immediately, should they be granted authority, with the 
possible exception of alpha-numeric, which may be delayed slight-
ly for technical reasons. They also propose to offer network 
paging as soon as it is available. American offers the same 
present capabilities, and proposes the same future service. MTI 
presently offers all forms except alpha-numeric. MTI has begun 
investigating possible network affiliation, but has no concrete 
plans at present. Industrial can presently offer tone, and tone 
and voice. It has the technical capabilities of offering 
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digital, but at present has no frequencies available to it for 
that purpose. It expects they will be available, and it proposes 
to offer such service as soon as it is possible. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The issue turns upon the construction of Utah Code 
Annotated 54-2-1 (22) , which gives regulatory jurisdiction to the 
Commission over telephone corporations as defined therein. An 
integral part of that definition incorporates a separate defini-
tion of a "telephone line" which U.C.A. 54-2-1 (21) defines to be 
"all conduits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, 
instruments and appliances, and all other 
real estate and fixtures and personal proper-
ty owned, controlled, operated, or managed in 
connection with or to facilitate communica-
tion by telephone whether such communication 
is had with or without the use of trans-
mission wires." 
2. Because the Utah statute uses the terras "facilitate 
communication by telephone whether such communication is had with 
or without the use of transmission wires," it simply is not clear 
that the Legislature specifically intended to include one-way 
paging service within the regulatory jurisdiction of this Commis-
sion. In construing its jurisdiction as a matter of first 
impression, the Commission first considers the plain meaning of 
the underlying statute. Where the statute is ambiguous, as here, 
we examine the decisions of courts for guidance in construing the 
law; and where reasonably direct guidance is lacking in author-
itative case law, we endeavor to apply a prudent judgment ground-
ed in our regulatory experience which takes into account the 
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philosophical and economic bases for affording certain enter-
prises the unique status of regulated monopolies, as well as 
considerations of public interest in receiving necessary utility 
service. The parties in this matter have referred the Commission 
to many cases from our own and other states, some of which have 
opted for a regulatory plan for paging service, and some which 
have not. The weight of case authority is split, and we are 
persuaded by our review of Utah cases that the Utah Supreme Court 
has never squarely addressed the Commission's jurisdiction over 
paging service. 
3. In the 1974 !!cbile Telephone Service of Southern Utah 
— - - — -~———'—-
case (No. 6969) , the Commission granted a paging certificate? 
however, two facts are significant with respect to that decision. 
First, the application dees net appear to have been contested, 
and therefore the issue of jurisdiction was not argued before the 
Commission in an adversarial context. Second, the Commission made 
no findings nor conclusions from which it may be inferred that 
the issue of jurisdiction was ever fully considered, and for 
whatever reason, the Commission failed to declare that it had 
jurisdiction to issue the certificate. We conclude as a matter 
of law that the Commission had no such jurisdiction, and that the 
order in that case was null and void. We further conclude that 
the inclusion of paging service in any certificates issued by the 
Commission, authorizing the holders to provide mobile telephone 
service, was error, and that the portions of orders conferring 
authority to provide paging service are null and void. 
c-8 
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4. Protestants refer to the Commission's Order In the 
Matter of the Investigation of the Practices and Operations of 
Medic-Call, a corporation, Harold Jensen, M.D., Professional 
Exchange Answering Service and Industrial Communications Company, 
Investigation Docket No. 120 (1969), in support of the proposi-
tion that this Commission has already squarely faced and decided 
the issue of its jurisdiction over paging services. However, as 
we see it, the debate in that proceeding was over the question of 
whether or not Medic-Call was offering its service to the public 
generally, whereas, in the instant proceeding the debate is over 
different questions, one of which is whether or not a paging 
service is a telephone corporation within the meaning of our 
statutes. We note that in Medic-Call v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 P.2d 258 (1970), which is the appeal of 
the Commission's Order in Investigation Docket No. 120, the Court 
in its opinion merely assumes arguendo that a paging service is a 
telephone corporation: here we cannot so assume. 
It is also worthwhile to note the rather stinging dicta of 
the Court in Medic-Call; 
"The service (paging service) is compa-
rable to that which would be rendered by 
runners or call boys to notify doctors that 
they were wanted on the phone. One wonders 
just how the defendant would go about reg-
ulating the service even if it had the power 
to do so. If defendants can regulate the 
service rendered by plaintiffs herein, could 
they not with equal propriety regulate the 
semaphore signaling of the Boy Scouts or the 
smoke signals of the Indians on a hunting 
expedition?" (at page 260, 470 P.2d) 
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Protestants cite the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Hvrun Gibbons & Sens Co., 602 P.2d 684 (1979), to 
demonstrate that the term "telephone line" includes the plant, 
equipment and facilities used to provide paging services. In 
Williams the Court construed the meaning of ntelephone line" but 
did so by stating only that the phrase included "radio-telephone 
communications." The Williams case presented the issue to the 
Court in the context of an eminent domain proceeding, and the 
question of whether plaintiff had condemnation powers required a 
finding that the plaintiff was in fact a public utility. The 
business of the plaintiff for which eminent domain had been 
sought was to install a transmitter to operate radio telephone 
and paging service. The Court didn't specify that paging is to 
be treated within the definition of a "telephone line" but relied 
mere generally on "radio-telephone communications" as failing 
within the broad definition ("whether with or without trans-
mission wires") without identifying services which constitute 
radio-telephone communications. Clearly, mobile telephone 
service is within the meaning of the statute, and the case can be 
said to stand for that; however, we conclude that the nature of 
pacing service is so fundamentally distinct and different from 
mobile telephone service that the Court1s language in that case 
falls short of declaring paging to be a telephone line. 
We read the fleeting references to paging service in the 
cases to mean that paging has been a distinctly separate service 
which companies have offered adjunctively to their customers 
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because the service can technologically dovetail with mobile 
telephone service? but the two are not the sane in fact, nor 
should they be treated the same in law. 
5. The distinction between paging and telephone service is 
critical because if in defining "telephone line" one focuses on 
the phrase "facilitate telephone communication," the scope of 
potentially regulated services becomes staggering. Conceivably 
the Commission should then regulate all suppliers of telephone 
equipment, e.g. Radio Shack, Sears, J.C.Penney, Panasonic-
suppliers of wiring components? all suppliers of telephone 
directories, including the many not affiliated with the Bell 
system? telephone answering services, telephone answering devices 
and all such suppliers? radio talk stations? newspaper classified 
advertising, jad absurdum. The focus instead should be on the 
connotation of telepnone service which implies interactive, and 
at least potentially extended two-way communication. That was 
certainly the focus in 1917 when the statute was enacted, since 
most of the services new technologically feasible were not 
foreseen at that tine. Paging service is conceptually no differ-
ent from answering services (which have never been considered 
appropriate objects of state regulation)? it is the same service 
offered through a different medium. Telephone service over land 
lines or radio waves is fundamentally the sane service irrespec-
t i v e of the means of transmission. But telephone service is a 
-two-way service? paging service is one-way call notification. 
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6. Finally, we consider it appropriate to evaluate paging 
service in the context of the traditional characteristics which 
have warranted granting of a state-regulated monopoly. Histor-
ically, legislatures have narrowly circumscribed the conditions 
which justify such a departure from a free market economy. Those 
conditions have generally included the providing of a service 
which is deemed necessary and essential to the citizenry, the 
existence of natural monopolies because of significant capital 
investment necessary to achieve economies of scale in production, 
and the efficient use of minimally intrusive rights of way across 
land. An objective analysis of paging service persuades us to 
conclude the following: 
(a) Pacing is a valuable convenience for a small but 
growing number of pecple. Industrial presented information to 
the effect that it has the capacity to serve 200,000 paging 
subscribers, bur presently serves approximately 2,500 subscrib-
ers. While pacing is beneficial and efficient in aiding instant 
response to telephone calls, we cannot say that the service is a 
necessary public service in the sense that water, electricity, 
natural gas and basic telephone service are necessary to the 
well-being of the citizenry, nor can it be said that a signifi-
cant number of telephone customers avail themselves of the 
service. 
(b) The capital necessary to provide paging service is net 
subct^niJj*T compared to the capital commitments common to other 
utility services. 
wriwi- ..* v/ • O J — ; O t - J l 
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(c) The public is not inconvenienced by the plant or 
transmission of paging signals in the way it would* be inconve-
nienced by unlimited electric companies seeking transmission 
rights of way. ^  Whether there are three or three hundred paging 
companies, the intrusion upon land would be minimal. 
(d) Paging may have been a service in short supply because 
the FCC imposed severe limits to market entry by restricting 
frequencies within the RF spectrum; however, the FCC decision to 
release 96 new frequencies significantly alters the supply 
consideration and represents a major federal policy to liberalize 
market access and foster competition in the paging industry. 
(e) If competition can produce service and price benefits 
to paging customersr there would appear to be no substantial 
reason for this Commission to exercise jurisdiction. Certainly 
there would be obvious advantages to the Protestants if marker 
entry were restricted, but the purpose of state regulation isn't 
to protect the interests of regulated companies for their own 
sake; it is to protect the public interest. Conceivably, there 
will be many market entrants, and it is likely that seme will 
flourish and some will fail. We see no significant risk to the 
public if some providers fail, and we are persuaded that the open 
market will in time be the best safeguard of the public interest, 
both in terms of price and service. 
(f) The Protestants urge the Commission to assert jurisdic-
tion to preclude duplication of facilities, but duplication is 
the essence of competition, and such a policy would be rational 
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only if the investment necessary to launch a paging service were 
vastly greater than it is. 
7. The issues raised herein demonstrate that it is an 
appropriate time to request that our Legislature modernize the 
definition of telephone service. The questions in this case, as 
well as the the Commission's decision to assert limited regulato-
ry oversight of WATS resellers, and the restructuring of the 
telephone industry incident to the break-up of the Bell System 
merit a careful evaluation of what ought to be regulated and what 
cannot be regulated in order to better serve the communication 
requirements of Utahns. We are attempting to crunch the tech-— 
nology of 1983 into the terminology of 1917, and there are too f 
many technological and economic developments to make ambiguous j 
f 
definitions advisable or workable. 
Accordingly, we make the following Order: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the application 
of Page America of Utah, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc., Certificate No. 1414 issued in Case No. 5169, 
insofar as the same purports to grant authority for paging 
service be, and the same hereby is, hereby amended to delete 
therefrom any reference to paging service, and that a copy of 
this Order be filed and made effective in said case; and 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity No. 1504 issued in Case No. 5482 to David R. Williams, 
dba Industrial Communications, be, and the same hereby is, 
amended to delete therefrom any reference to mobile paging 
service; and that a copy of this Order be filed and made effec-
tive in said case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the authority of Mobile Tele-
phone Service of Southern Utah Inc., Certificate No. 1856 issued 
in Case No. 6969, insofar as the same grants authority for paging 
service, is hereby voided, and that a copy of this Order be filed 
and made effective in said case. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day of November, 
1983. 
/s/ A. Robert Thurman, 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 28th day of November, 1982f as 
the Report and Order of the Commission. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si David R. Irvine, Commissioner 
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Isl Georcia E. Peterson, Secretarv 
C-15 
ADDENDUM D 
WILLIAMS v. PUBLIC SI 
CiteM720P.2d 
David R. WILLIAMS, dba Industrial 
Communications, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man; David R. Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
MOBILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, Petitioner, 
v. 
The PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Brent H. Cameron, Chair-
man, David R. Irvine, Commissioner, 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner, Re-
spondents. 
Nos. 19867, 19873. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 4, 1986. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Public Service Commission holding that 
Commission had no authority to regulate 
one-way mobile telephone paging services. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act so that Commis-
sion was required to follow Act's procedur-
al requirements. 
Vacated and remanded. 
1. Telecommunications e»461 
Public Service Commission's decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
and necessity was necessary to operate 
one-way mobile telephone paging service, 
announced in letter to prospective operator, 
was a "rule" within meaning of Adminis-
trative Rule Making Act [U.C.A.1953, 6&-
46-3(4) (Repealed)], so that Commission 
was required to follow Act's procedural 
fcVICE COMTs' OF UTAH Utah 7 7 3 
13 (Utah 1986) 
requirements. U.C.A.1953, 54-1-1 et seq., 
54-1-1.6, 54-7-1.5, 54-7-13, 63-46a-l et 
seq., 63-46a-2(8), 63-46a-3(3)(a), 63-46a-4; 
U.CA.1953, 63-46-1, 6^-46-3(4), 63-46-5 
(Repealed); Const Art 1, § 7; U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Telecommunications e=>461 
Commissioners on Public Service Com-
mission who had participated in decision 
that no certificate of public convenience 
was required to operate one-way mobile 
telephone paging service, announced in let-
ter to prospective operator, would not be 
precluded from considering the jurisdiction-
al matter on remand on basis that they had 
violated statutory prohibitions against ex 
parte communications, where prospective 
operator was not party to any proceeding 
pending before Commission at time letter 
was issued. U.C.A.1953, 54-7-1.5. 
Keith E. Taylor, F. Robert Reeder, Mi-
chael L. Larsen, Brinton R. Burbidge, Salt 
Lake City, for petitioner. 
David L. Stott, Stuart L Poelman, Salt 
Lake City, for intervenor Amer. Paging. 
Stephen R. Randle, Salt Lake City, for 
Page Amer. 
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Craig 
Rich, Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Petitioners Industrial Communications 
and Mobile Telephone, Inc., appeal from an 
order of the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion ("Commission,f) holding that the Com-
mission has no authority to regulate one-
way mobile telephone paging services. Pe-
titioners allege, inter alia, that the Com-
mission did not follow proper administra-
tive procedures in concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commis-
sion fafled to adhere to proper require-
ments in ruling on the jurisdictional issue, 
and accordingly reverse and remand for a 
D - l 
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new hearing that comports with the appli-
cable statutes. 
• Understanding the history of the Com-
mission's assertion of regulatory authority 
over one-way paging services is important 
to this case. In 1962, the Commission 
granted a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity to operate both a two-way 
mobile telephone system and a one-way 
paging service to petitioner Mobile Tele-
phone, Inc. By this action, and without 
objection from any party, the Commission 
assumed jurisdiction over both one-way 
paging and two-way mobile telephone ser-
vices under sections 54-2-1(21), (22), and 
(30) of the Code.1 Between 1962 and 1983 
the Commission granted similar dual au-
thority certificates to three other compa-
nies. In 1974, the Commission granted to 
Mobile Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc., a 
single authority certificate covering only 
one-way paging service. From the record, 
it appears that the Commission has, on 
occasion, denied requests for certificates 
for one-way paging authority. Until 1983, 
however, the Commission's authority to 
regulate one-way paging services was not 
questioned. 
In the early 1980's, the Federal Commu-
nications Commission deregulated radio 
frequencies for use in paging services. 
Sixty-nine channels were made available in 
1. U.C.A.. 1953, § 54-2-1(30) (Rcpl. Vol. 6A, 
1974), states in part: The term 'public utility' 
includes every . . . telephone corporation . . . 
where the service is performed for, or the com-
modity delivered to the public generally " 
Subsection (22) states: 
The term "telephone corporation" includes ev-
ery corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees and receivers or trustees appointed 
by any court whatsoever, owning, controlling, 
operating or managing any telephone line for 
public service within this state. 
Subsection (21) states: 
The term -telephone line" includes all con-
duits, ducts, poles, wires, cables, instruments 
and appliances, and all other real estate and 
fixtures and personal property owned, con-
trolled, operated or managed in connection 
with or to facilitate communication by tele-
phone whether such communication is had 
with or without the use of transmission wires. 
Z See 47 C.F.R. 22.501(a)(1) and (4), (d) and 
(p)(l) (1983). 
Utah on a first-come, first-served basis.* 
Page America, Inc., American Paging, Inc., 
and United Paging Corporation each re-
ceived a permit from the Federal Communi-
cations Commission to operate on one of 
the new frequencies early in 1983.3 In 
May of 1983, American Paging's attorney 
contacted Commissioner Irvine to inquire 
whether American Paging could operate a 
one-way paging system without a certifi-
cate. At the request of this attorney, Com-
missioner Irvine discussed the issue with 
the other commissioners. Thereafter, the 
Commission sent a letter to the attorney 
for American Paging, dated June 3, 1983, 
stating that in the Commission's opinion, no 
certificate was required. It added that the 
Commission would not request a hearing 
on the issue.4 That letter is the basis of 
the controversy here. 
In August of 1983, Page America applied 
for a certificate to operate a paging ser-
vice; petitioner Industrial Communications 
protested the application. The Commission 
scheduled a public hearing on the applica-
tion for December of 1983, indicating its 
desire to "review" its jurisdiction over one-
way paging services. Page America later 
moved for a determination that it was ex-
empt from regulation. The Commission 
scheduled a hearing on that motion for 
November 7th. 
3. After receiving its permit from the FCC, Unit-
ed Paging Corporation applied to the Commis-
sion for a certificate of convenience and neces-
sity, which application was pending at the time 
of the Commission's hearing now under review. 
United Paging did not take part in that hearing 
and its present status is not apparent from the 
record. 
4. The letter read in pertinent part: 
Inasmuch as American Paging of Utah is pro-
posing to offer only one-way paging service, 
rather than telephone service as defined in the 
Utah Code, it does not appear necessary for 
your client to file an application for a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity. As 
a matter of policy the Commission does not 
construe its jurisdiction on an informal basis, 
but deems the statute sufficiently clear on its 
fact that it would not, on its own motion, 
require a hearing with respect to your pro-
posed operation. 
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Meanwhile, American Paging had begun 
operations without a certificate in reliance 
'on the Commission's June letter declining 
to exercise jurisdiction. Industrial Commu-
nications therefore asked the Commission 
to issue a cease and desist order to stop 
American Paging from operating without a 
certificate. A hearing on the cease and 
desist request was held October 24, 1983. 
At that hearing, the Commission admitted 
it was in a dilemma inasmuch as it had 
"contradicted itself somewhat by the is-
suance of the June 3rd, 1983 letter." The 
Commission refused to order American 
Paging to stop operations; however, it or-
dered American Paging not to accept new 
customers until after the November hear-
ing on Page America's certificate at which 
the jurisdictional issue would be reviewed. 
Following the November hearing, the 
Commission formally ruled that it had no 
jurisdiction to regulate one-way paging ser-
vices, effectively deregulating that field. 
The Commission dismissed Page America's 
application for a certificate and cancelled 
the certificates of Industrial Communica-
tions and Mobile Telephone, Inc., to the 
extent they authorized one-way paging ser-
vices. It also cancelled the certificate 
granted to Mobile Telephone of Southern 
Utah, Inc., authorizing the operation of a 
one-way paging system.5 
After the ruling, Industrial Communica-
tions, which had opposed deregulation, 
sought a reversal of the Commission's or-
der and a disclosure of ex parte communi-
cations relating to the jurisdictional issue. 
It also moved for a rehearing before a 
commission pro tempore, claiming that by 
virtue of the June letter to American Pag-
ing, the Commission had prejudged the jur-
5. Two companies not participating in the hear-
ing still hold certificates of convenience and 
necessity for one-way paging services. 
6. Section 54-1-1.6 of the Code, enacted in 1983 
(1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 5), provides for a 
commissioner pro tempore to be appointed by 
the governor when a commissioner is "tempo-
rarily dismissed or disqualified.'' Commission-
ers pro tern shall have the qualifications re-
quired for public service commissioners. 
7. The Utah Rule Making Act was repealed and 
' replaced in its entirety after the facts giving rise 
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isdictional issues.* The Commission ac-
knowledged the June letter and the con-
tacts leading up to it, but refused to set 
aside its order for any reason. On appeal, 
Industrial Communications and Mobile 
Telephone, Inc., challenge the Commis-
sion's actions. 
The principal procedural point raised by 
petitioners is that the Commission's June 
letter effectively operated to relinquish the 
Commission's jurisdiction over oneway 
paging, and stripped petitioners and their 
similarly situated competitors of a valuable 
property right—their certificates. Petition-
ers argue that under the provisions of the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, the 
hearing provisions of the Public Service 
Commission Act, and the due process claus-
es of state and federal constitutions, the 
June letter constituted a de facto rule mak-
ing which required that all interested par-
ties be given proper notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. See U.C.A., 1953, § 63-
46-5 (2nd Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978); U.C.A., 
1953, § 54-7-13 (Repl. Vol 6A, 1974); Utah 
Const art I, § 7; and U.S. Const amend. 
XIV. 
[1] We first inquire whether the Com-
mission's actions complied with the proce-
dural requirements of the statutes govern-
ing agency rule making or agency adjudica-
tion. Any state agency promulgating a 
rule must follow the procedures specified 
in that act U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46-1 (2nd 
Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978).7 A rule is defined as 
a "statement of general applicability . . . 
that implements or interprets the law or 
prescribes the policy of the agency in the 
administration of its functions " 
U.CA., 1953, § 63-46-3(4) (2nd Repl. Vol 
to this action occurred. Our conclusion would 
not be any different were we to analyze this 
case under the new statute. 1985 Utah Laws ch. 
158, § 2. The statute now requires rule making 
whenever "agency actions affect a class of per-
sons" and defines a rule as "a statement made 
by an agency that applies to a general class of 
persons . . . [which] implements or interprets 
policy made by statute " U.CJL, 1953, 
§ 63-46a-3(3Xa). -2(8) (2nd Repl. VoL 7A. 1978 
and Supp.1985). 
D - 3 
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7A, 1978). The Public Utilities Act, also 
relied on by petitioners, requires that the 
Commission give notice and hold a hearing 
before it alters, amends, or rescinds an 
order or decision. U.C.A., 1953, § 54-7-13 
(Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). Petitioners claim 
that the procedural requirements of at 
least one of these statutes apply here be-
cause the June letter constituted either a 
"rule" within the meaning of the Rule Mak-
ing Act, or an "order" within the meaning 
of the Public Utilities Act. 
The Commission argues that the June, 
1983, letter was not a rule making within 
the meaning of the Utah Rule Making Act 
because it did not have general applicabili-
ty. The Commission also argues that be-
cause it had never formally determined 
that it had jurisdiction to regulate paging 
services under the Public Utilities Act, it 
was free to announce its opinion on the 
subject without any procedural formalities. 
There is no merit to the Commission's ar-
guments. 
As an initial matter, we note that the 
Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
seems most directly on point here. It deals 
in some specificity with matters that the 
Public Utilities Act covers only inferential-
ly, and the Rule Making Act's provisions do 
not appear inconsistent with the earlier en-
acted utility statute. 
The pivotal question is whether the deci-
sion announced by the Commission in the 
June letter amounted to a rule. It might 
be argued that the Commission's action 
here is merely legitimate law development 
through adjudication as opposed to rule 
making. We acknowledge that there is a 
variance oi opinion on when an agency is 
engaged in rule making and must follow 
formal rule making procedures, and when 
an agency may legitimately proceed by 
way of adjudication. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 89 S.Ct 
1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969); and NLRB v. 
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct 
1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). However, we 
think that there are some fundamental 
8. For these reasons, section 54-7-1.5, governing 
the functions of the Commission when entering 
points of reference in this area of the law 
that are of assistance in determining 
whether the Commission should have pro-
ceeded by formal rule making. Professor 
Davis summarized some of these considera-
tions. 
Although a retroactive clarification of 
uncertain law may be brought about 
through adjudication, according to [SEC 
v. Cheney Corp., 332 U.S. 194 [67 S.Ct 
1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1347) ] and its many 
progency . . . , the'problem may be differ-
ent when an agency through adjudication 
makes a change in clear law, as when it 
overrules a batch of its own decisions, 
especially if private parties have acted in 
reliance on the overruled decisions. 
2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 
§ 7:25, at 122 (2d ed. 1978). Interpreting 
the definition oi "rule" contained in section 
63-46-3(4), in light of these considerations, 
leads us to the conclusion that the Commis-
sion was engaged in rule making and had 
to follow the requirements of the Utah 
.Administrative Rule Making Act8 
First, the Commission's decision was 
generally applicable: by deregulating the 
one-way paging market and permitting 
open competition in the market, the deci-
sion altered the rights of all certificate 
holders, despite their explicit reliance on 
the Commission's prior iroterpretation. Sec-
ond, the letter interpreted the scope of the 
Commission's statutory regulatory powers, 
thus "interpreting] the law," within the 
meaning of the Rule Making Act More-
over, in so acting the Commission, in the 
words of Professor Davis, made a "change 
in clear law." For over twenty years, the 
Gws*n*is&\ofc Vvas interpreted its authonty 
over telephone corporations to include one-
way paging services. It has required cer-
tificate holders to file tariffs and pay public 
utility sales taxes. It has denied some 
requests for certificates. In one case, it 
issued a certificate that covered only one-
way paging. In Medic-Call, Inc. v. Public 
Service Commission, 24 Utah 2d 273, 470 
p.2d 258 (1970), the Commission even went 
an order, has no application to the June letter 
or the proceedings leading up to its issuance. 
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to court to defend its' jurisdiction over pag-
ing services.9 
Under all these circumstances, we con-
clude that the Commission cannot reverse 
its long-settled position regarding the scope 
of its jurisdiction and announce a funda-
mental policy change without following the 
requirements of the Utah Administrative 
Rule Making Act. See, e.g., Ford Motor 
Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir.1981), 
cert denied, 459 U.S. 999, 103 S.Ct 368, 74 
L.Ed.2d 394 (1982); see also 2 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise § 7:25, at 
125 (2d ed.1978). These requirements were 
not met. Nonparties were not given notice 
of the Commission's intention to reconsider 
its long-held position in connection with the 
June letter. And the November adjudica-
tive hearing certainly cannot be considered 
an adequate substitute for a rule making 
proceeding. Many of the protections pro-
vided for by the Act were missing from 
that proceeding, including adequate ad-
vance notices to all affected parties, an 
opportunity to participate, and an opportu-
nity to comment on the proposed rule. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 63-46a-4 (2d Repl. Vol. 7A, 
1978, Supp.1985). Because the require-
ments of the Act were not satisfied, the 
rule is vacated and the matter is remanded 
for further proceedings. 
[2] The next issue is whether the cur-
rent commissioners should be precluded 
from considering the jurisdictional matter 
on remand. Petitioners contend that the 
commissioners who participated in the deci-
sion announced in the June letter had pre-
judged the jurisdictional issue. Therefore, 
they request that we order the recusal of 
all the commissioners and the appointment 
of a commission pro tempore. 
Petitioners assert that recusal is neces-
sary because the opinion announced in the 
June letter violated the statutory prohibi-
tions against ex parte communication 
about matters pending before the Commis-
sion. Section 54-7-1.5 provides in part: 
9. This Court ruled in Medic-Call that the PSC 
could have no jurisdiction over a private non-
profit paging service because it was not a public 
utility. We did not reach the issue of whether a 
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No member of the public service commis-
sion . . . shall make or knowingly cause 
to be made to any party any communica-
tion relevant to the merits of any matter 
under adjudication unless notice and an 
opportunity to be heard are afforded to 
all parties. No party shall make or 
knowingly cause to be made to any mem-
ber of the commission . . . an ex parte 
communication relevant to the merits of 
any matter under adjudication. 
There are several problems with petition-
ers' argument. By its terms the statute 
does not apply to dealings between the 
Commission and American Paging. In 
May and June of 1983, American Paging 
was not a party to any proceeding pending 
before the Commission that involved the 
question of the Commission's jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. Moreover, 
the letter was not an adjudication but, in 
substance, a rule making, as we have noted 
above. Therefore, any dealings between 
American Paging and the commissioners 
could not be a communication between a 
"party" and a member of the Commission 
"relevant to the merits" of "any matter 
under adjudication." Second, section 54-7-
1.5 was not effective until July 1, 1983, 
almost a month after the letter was writ-
ten. See 1983 Utah Laws ch. 246, § 15. 
It is true that the later proceedings be-
fore the Commission on the application of 
Page America for a certificate should be 
classified as an "adjudication" within the 
meaning of section 54-7-1.5, and that these 
proceedings occurred after the effective 
date of the statute. However, that does 
not change the.nature of the May and June 
communications between the Commission 
and American Paging nor the fact that the 
statute, by its terms, does not apply to 
them. 
Because the jurisdictional issue likely 
will be resolved by a rule making proceed-
ing on remand and will obviate the need for 
further proceedings, we need not further 
publicly available paging service, such as peti-
tioners here operate, would be a public utility 
because our holding was limited to the private 
nature of the arrangements before us. 
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consider whether and under what circum-
stances recusal may be required in adminis-
trative adjudications when the specific pro-
visions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply. 
Plainly, having participated in a rule mak-
ing proceeding does not automatically pre-
clude a commissioner from participating in 
a later, properly conducted adjudication. 
We have considered the other issues 
raised and find their disposition unneces-
sary to the result. The Commission's rule 
is of no force and effect, and its order is 
vacated. The matter is remanded for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver 
License Services, Utah Department of 
Public Safety, Defendant and Respon-
dent 
No. 20112. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1986. 
Utah State Driver License Division re-
voked driving privileges of driver for peri-
od of one year. The Seventh District 
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. David-
son, J., affirmed the administrative deci-
sion. Driver appealed. The Supreme 
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for 
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs was intended by legislature 
to protect public safety and apprehend 
drunken driver before he or she strikes and 
may not be construed to exclude those 
whose vehicles are presently immobile be-
cause of mechanical trouble, and (2) driv-
er's refusal to submit to breath test upon 
rumors that tiiere had been incidents of 
tampering with breathalyzer in the past 
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting de-
fendant to license revocation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Automobiles «=»144.2(9) 
In revocation proceeding, Driver Divi-
sion has burden to show that operator of 
vehicle was in actual physical control of 
motor vehicle and that arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that operator was 
under influence of alcohol. 
2. Automobiles «=»144.2(10) 
In trial de novo, district court must 
determine by preponderance of evidence 
whether driver's license was subject to rev-
ocation for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10. 
3. Automobiles *=>144.2(3) 
Supreme Court's review of district 
court's determination as to whether driv-
er's license was subject to revocation for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol 
is deferential to trial court's view of evi-
dence unless trial court has misapplied 
principles of law or its findings are clearly 
against weight of evidence. 
4. Automobiles *=>144.1(1) 
Even if truck was inoperable at time 
that licensee was found sleeping in it and 
arrested, that would not preclude him from 
having "actual physical control" over truck 
so that his driver's license could be revoked 
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alco-
hol content U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2). 
5. Automobiles *»349 
Statute providing for arrest of one "in 
actual physical control" of vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs 
was intended by legislature to protect pub-
lic safety and apprehend drunken driver 
before he or she strikes and may not be 
construed to exclude those vehicles are 
presently immobile because of mechanical 
D-6 
ADDENDUM E 
FiLED iN CuERK'S OFFICE 
S?.i; Lake Cojnty Utah 
STUART L. POELMAN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN £ MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
SEP 1 0 1S86 
H D-rih-i.cy.Cicrl, 3rdD.s' C o n 
By 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID R. WILLIAMS d/b/a 
INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN PAGING, INC. OF 
UTAH, a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
MOEILE TELEPHONE, INC., a 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN PAGING, INC., a 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C86-1903 
(Judge Hanson) 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, Clarification, 
Certification, Stay of ProceedinaJB^and_Protective Order 
came on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled 
Court on September 2, 19B6, and the following is acknowledged; 
F.-1 
1. Keith E. Taylor appeared on behalf of plaintiff 
David R. Williams, Kay M. Lewis appeared on behalf of plain-
tiff Mobile Telephone, Inc., and Stuart L. Poelman appeared 
on behalf of defendant American Paging, Inc. of Utah. 
2. The Court heard the respective arguments of counsel 
and has reviewed the pleadings and memoranda filed herein. 
3. Defendant American Paging, Inc. of Utah had pre-
viously filed its Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs had pre-
viously filed their Motions for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Said motions were argued to the Court by both written memo-
randa and orcil argument presented on June 23, 1966. On 
August 12, 1966, the Court entered its Order Denying Defen-
dant fs Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs1 
Motions for Partial Summarv Judcmert and a Declaratorv 
- ^ 
Judgment. 
4. The parties have stipulated that the Court's Order 
Denying Defendant* s Motion for Sumr.ary Judgment and Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment entered 
August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory Judgment entered in 
connection therewith should be vacated. 
5. Based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. 
Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 773, the Court finds that 
the providing of one-way paging service to the general public 
in the State of Utah constitutes the services of a "public 
E-2-
utility/1 which is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction 
of the Utah Public Service Commission. 
6. The Court finds that defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and plaintiffs' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment should 
be denied in all respects, except for the Declaratory Judg-
ment set forth herein. 
7. The Court finds that consideration of the questions 
raised concerning a stay of this action pending appeal and 
a protective order covering further discovery should be 
continued for determination at a later time. 
8. The Court finds and the parties agree that this 
Order and Declaratory Judgment should be certified by the 
Court as a final judgment under the provisions of Rule 54(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that a separate certi-
fication thereof should be entered. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BASED UPON THE FOREGOING AND GOOD CAUSE 
APPEARING THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Court's Order Denying Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Granting Plaintiffs' Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment entered August 12, 1986, and any Declaratory 
Judgment entered in connection therewith be and the same are 
hereby vacated; 
2. It is declared that the providing of one-way paging 
service to the general public constitutes the service of a 
E -3-
••public utility" which is subject to the regulatory juris-
diction of the Utah Public Service Commission; 
3. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs1 
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment are denied except as 
to the Declaratory Judgment set forth in the next proceeding 
paragraph. 
4. Consideration of a stay of this action pending 
appeal and of a protective order covering any further dis-
covery herein is continued; 
5. Defendant's request for certification under Rule 54(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is gramted and is con-
tained in the Court's Certification for/appeal entered here-
with, 
DATED this /0 day of September, 1986. 
/Timothy R. Hanson 
'District Judge 
.. ^ 
ADDENDUM F 
State of Utah 
Administrative Rule Analysis 
Notice of Proposed Rule/Change 
O.A.* FILE NUMBER 
OOS304 
AGENCY FILE NUMBER 
Office.of Administrative Rules 
State Archives Building, State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone 533-4647 
P u b l i c S e r v i c e Commission of Utah Department: Agency. 
Address: 160 Eas t 300 South , SLC, Dtah 
Contact Person: David L. S t o t t or Joe Dunlop 
Telephone. 530-6716 
t. SHORT TITLE OF RULE 
Commission jurisdiction over one-way paging services 
l BRIEF SUMMARY OF RULE OR CHANGE AND REASON FOR IT 
The Public Service Commission of Utah does not have jurisdiction 
over one-way paging services. The reason for the rule is thfct one-way 
paging service does not fall within the definition- of a "telephone" -
corporation11 in that such service does not utilize a "telephone line". 
\ ANTICIPATED COST IMPACT OF RULE - UCA 63-46a-4(3)(d) 
No c o s t impact 
\. TYPE OF NOTICE 
D PROPOSED RULE (NEW, AMEND OR REPEAL) 
D CHANGE IN PROPOSED RULE (CHANGES PROPOSED RULE NUMBER 
D 120-DAY RULE - UCA 63-46a-7 
.) D FIVE-YEAR REVIEW/CONTINUATION 
>. JUSTIFICATION FOR 120-DAY RULE CHECKED ABOVE 
I r f l RULE AUTHORIZED BY STATE CODE (CITATION, 5 4 . ^ !
 & S x ^ r e m o C o u r t C a s e N Q . l 9 g g 7 
D RULE REQUIRED BY FEDERAL MANDATE (U S CODE OR FED REGISTER CITATION) 
'. PUBLIC MAY PARTICIPATE IN RULEMAKING BY 
D PUBLIC HEARING 
>ATE: TIME 
>LACE: 
D APPEARANCE AT 
AGENCY UNTIL: 
ZD WRITTEN COMMENT 
U N T , L K a y / , 1936 
NOTE PUBLIC MAY REQUEST HEARING IN ACCORDANCE WITH UCA63-46a-5(1)(b) 
THE FULL TEXT OF ALL PROPOSED ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OR RULE CHANGES IS PUBLISHED IN THE UTAH STATE BULLETIN UNLESS 
EXCLUDED BECAUSE OF LENGTH AND SPACE LIMITATION THE FULL TEXT MAY BE INSPECTED AT THE AGENCY (ADDRESS ABOVE) OR 
DFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 
V OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RUUSS" 
-RECEIVEO?V: 
I M T O f r ^ ' ^ L j i s ^ ^ " " ^ , ^ T I M E : . > « 0 p ^ 
' 120-OAY RULE EFFECTIVE: 
I AUTHORI2ATI 
March 18 , 1B86? 
SIGNATURE OF AGENC^ MEAD OR^tJtS+GNEE 
Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
DATE 
PSC of Utah 
MEMORANDUM 
APPROVED BY COMMISSIONERS: 
BRENT K CAMERON " - ^ ' 
JAMES M. BYRNE c '•'•' r } _ 
BRIAN I STEWART - ^ T *'"*• 
TO: 
FROM: 
DATE: 
Brent H. Cameron 
James *'. Byrne 
Ted Stewart 
Joe Dunlop 
May 16, 1986 
RE: RULE ON ONE-WAY PA^INu si-.Kv: <_^, uase No. 86-999-0* 
I recommend adoption of the one-way paging rule elective today. 
F-2 
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ADDENDUM G 
_ p'nro1"^ TF1? PU^TJIT crpvjpp COMMISSION O17 TTTZ^ -
In the Matter o^ +-he Applica- ) 
tion of AMERTCAN PAGING*, INC. > 
fOF UTAH) for a Certificate o^ > 
Convenience and Necessity to ) CAP17: vpt 85-?007-01 
Operate as a Public Utility ) 
Rendering Paging Service to the ) ORHEP GRANTING MOTION 
General Public in Areas or Box \ TO DISMISS 
Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, ) 
Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch) 
and Tooele Counties, Utah. ) 
"SSU^D: vav 23 , ^.986 
By the Commission: 
On or about August 10, i?33, Page America Inc. ^iled an 
application v;ith the Commission to provide one-way paging ser-
vice. On November 28, 1983, however, the Commission ruled that 
it had no statutory jurisdiction over paging services. The case 
was subsequently appealed to the Utah Supreme Court. 
On or about April 30, 1985 American Paging Inc. (Ameri-
can Paging) filed an application with the Commission to provide 
one-way paging service to the general public between points in 
Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Summit, Wasatch 
and Tooele Counties within that area. American Paging filed 
simultaneously a Motion to Dismiss its Application for the reason 
that the Commission, in its Order cf November 28, 1983, had 
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to regulate one-way 
paging services. American Paging also stated that although the 
1985 Utah Legislature amended the Public Utilities Act by adding 
Chapter 8b. empowering the Commission to wholly or partially 
exempt certain competitive telecommunication services or service 
C^ .Sr NO. 85-?0On-01 
- ? -
providers, said chapter did not expand the Commission1s jurisdic-
tion beyond that which it already had. 
On or about March 4, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that the Commission's deregulation of one-way paging was defec-
tive because the Commission had attempted the deregulation 
through an Order construing its jurisdiction rather than through 
rulemaking under the Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
Thereafter, in accord with the instruction of the 
Supreme Court, the Commission filed a notice of proposed rule-
making with the Office of Administrative Rules on April 15, 1986, 
which stated that the Commission did not have jurisdiction over 
cj.e-way paging and the reasons for it. Notice was provided to 
the parties. No party requested a hearing within the 15-day 
period following publication as required by the Utah Administra-
tive Rulemaking Act. The rule was formally adopted and made 
effective Mav 16, 1986. 
The Commission further concludes from the comments and 
oral arguments of the parties that Chapter 8B of the Public 
Utilities Act of the Utah Code does not expand the jurisdiction 
of the Commission to include one-way paging. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the 
following: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Commis-
sion, having issued a rule pursuant to the Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act and in accord with the direction of the Utah 
n—*) 
rzyqp "p. 85-2007-01 
- 3 -
Supreme Court that it does not have jurisdiction over one-way 
paging services and having further determined that Chapter 8B of 
the Public Utilities Act does not expand the jurisdiction of the 
Commission to include one-way paging, hereby grants American 
Paging's Motion to Dismiss its Application for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity to provide one-way paging services. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 23rd day of May, 
1986. 
2t / ^ / ^ . U LC /( 4 
Georgia p>. Pe te r son 
i t i # e 
/ v / 
Execul S e c r e t a r v 
./ .7 , ) y 
Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
( 
- , ^ ^ ^ , ^—Ztr /£ fj* ; <~ 
JarrT^s M. Byrne, Commissioner 
(. 
/ 
/ 
- . LLL-a £ 1 J-t. i ti i._ 
B^ian T . I S tewar t , ! Commissioner 
<x 
^rryynr TTTT "^ UPLTC SERVICE OCWISSIO'l OF UTAH -
AFFIDAVIT OF MAJLIS 
VA 
• s \ 
In the Matter o r the Application 
of AMERICAN PAGING, WC. (OF Tjrz^ 
for a Certificate of Convenience 
and Necessity to Operate as a 
Public Utility Rendering Paging 
Sendee to the General Public in 
Areas of Box Elder, Weber, Morgan, 
Davis, Salt Lake, Utah, Surmit, 
Wasatch and rT1ooe1e Counties, Utah. 
Countv o^ Salt Lake ) 
1 S55. 
S-.3*-e of Utah 
C*CT%
 N0# 85-20(T-01 
OR^ER G^AM^IMn MOTION TO DISMTSS 
Brenda Warner, be?ng du.lv sworn, deposes and says that she is a secretary regularly 
employed in the office of the Public Service Ccrnission o^ Utah, whose office is 
located at 160 East 300 South, fourth Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That there is a United States Post Office at Salt Lake City, and at the place of 
residence or place of business of the persons whose names are set forth below; and 
between Salt Lake City and residence or places of business, there is a regular 
cannunication by mail. 
That on the 23rd day of May, 1986, affiant served a true copy of the hereto attached 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS on the said persons by mailing such ccpy on said 
date in a post office in Salt Lake City, Utah, properly enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage prepaid thereon, legibly addressed to the following persons, 
at the addresses shewn: K 
* Stuart Poelinan ^jy^\r Bryan L. McDougal 
10 Exchange Place «,\^>Ncv Judge Building, Ste 735 
P.O. Box 3000 8 East Broadway 
SLC, UT 84110 SLC, UT 84111 
Also attached mailing list 
Subscribed and sworn to before me 
this 23rd day of May, 1986. 
My Camdssion Expires 
arvK-n in IQPQ 
Notary Puplic 
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah 
Brinton R. Burbidge 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
SLC, UT 84111 
Mobile Telephone, Inc. 
c/o Max Bangerter 
80 West 2100 South 
SLC, UT 84110 
Page America of Utah 
c/o Stephen R. Randle 
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER 
520 Boston Building 
SLC, UT 84111 
Kay M. Lewis 
JENSEN & LEWIS 
320 South 300 East, No. 1 
SLC, UT 84111 
Community Paging Corp. 
P.O. Box 10 
Lexington, NE 68850 
Mobile Telephone Service of 
Southern Utah, Inc. 
c/o Max Bangerter 
80 West 2100 South 
SLC, UT 84115 
W. L. Johnson 
AT&T Communications 
2600 N. Central Ave., Ste 300 
Phoenix, AZ 85012 
Randy L. Dryer 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147 
Patrick J. Oshie 
Office of Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
BUILDING MAIL 
Keith E. Taylor 
Industrial Communications 
P.O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147 
Gregory B. Monson 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, Ste 1200 
SLC, UT 84101 
Dwight M. Whitley, Jr. 
NewVector Communications, I 
3350 161st Avenue S.E. 
P.O. Box 7329 
Bellevue, WA 98008-1329 
Elder News & Journal 
n: Bruce Keyes 
gham City, UT 84302 
id Eskelsen 
eret News 
. Box 1257 
, UT 84110 
ention: Newsroom 
Enterprise 
. Box 11778 
neer Station 
, UT 84147-0778 
i/, Inc. 
5 South 3600 West 
, UT 84119 
en Standard Examiner 
n: Mark Shenefelt 
- 23rd Street 
. Box 951 
en, UT 84402 
y Desk 
t Lake T bune 
South ifcin 
, UT 84111 
ited Press International 
. Box 1375 
f UT 84111 
L Radio News 
Robins 
East South Temple 
f UT 84111 
I/McGraw-Hill 
y Sue White, Editor 
South Franklin Turnpike 
sey, NJ 07446 
n F. Hart 
ulatory Attorney 
Sprint Communications Corp, 
0 Old Bayshore, Ste 580 
lingame, CA 94010 
mas W. Forsgren, Esq. 
h Power & Light 
. Box 899 
, UT 84110 
01 Black, Librarian 
TON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
i South Third East 
_ UT RA111 
F. Robert Reeder, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P.O. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147 
ElC/Intelligence 
Lee Cokorinos 
Government Acquisitions 
48 West 38th Street 
New York, NY 10018 
Hershel Rakes, Director 
Telephone Services, UMC 37 
Utah State University 
Logan, UT 84322 
A, Robert Thorup, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
P.O. Box 45385 
SLC, UT 84145-0385 
BYU Financial Services 
D-148 Abraham Smoot Building 
Provo, UT 84602 
J. Randolph MacPherson 
Chief Regulatory Counsel-
Telecommunications, DoD 
Defense Communications Agency 
Attn: Code H115 
Washington, DC 20305-2000 
Michael Ginsberg 
Office of Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
BUILDING MIAL 
Energy Office 
355 West North Temple 
3 Triad Center, Ste 450 
BUILDING MAIL 
Kathleen D. Zick 
Department of Family & Consumer Studies 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, UT 84112 
Olof E. Zundel 
Utility Shareholders Association 
of Utah 
Steve Mecham 
Governor's Office 
203 State Capitol 
BUILDING MAIL 
1200 Beneficial 
36 South State 
SLC, UT 84111 
Life Tower 
Stephen Randle, Esq. 
520 Boston Building 
SLC, UT 84111 
Ted D. Smith, Esq. 
Mountain Bell Legal Department 
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610 
SLC, UT 84111 
AT&T Communications 
W. L. Johnson 
2600 N. Central, Ste. 300 
Phoenix, AZ 85004 
Geoffrey Williams 
IOMEGA Corporation 
1821 West 4000 South 
Roy, UT 84067 
Continental Telephone Company 
of the West 
Emmett Mays 
18 East Main 
Tremonton. UT 84337 
Bob Sugino 
Tax Commission 
Assessed Property Division 
BUILDING MAIL 
D. C. Petershagen 
State Telecommunications Services 
Rm 1226 State Office Building 
BUILDING MAIL 
